Binance will stop accepting mining shares at 07:00 UTC on November 10. Machines still pointed at its pool after that time will no longer earn through it. The immediate task for miners is a configuration change; the harder choice is who will assemble their blocks, calculate their rewards and hold the proceeds between settlement and withdrawal.
Summary
- Binance Pool will disconnect miners at 07:00 UTC on November 10, 2026.
- The pool’s reported hash power fell from about 26 EH/s in December to 9.2 EH/s in October.
- Binance’s final accounting will include eligible shares submitted before the November 10 cutoff.
- Pool pages remain accessible for records until November 24 at 07:00 UTC.
- Foundry USA, AntPool and F2Pool account for about 64.2% of the latest measured hash power.
The October 13 Binance closure notice covers Pool Savings, Cloud Mining and its transaction accelerator as well as Bitcoin mining. Binance gave a product review as its reason, with no pool profit figure or explanation of where its customers have committed to move. A miner who changes the address in a controller may be working again in minutes. Getting the same payment terms, reliable accounting and acceptable custody arrangements takes more care.
The first report on the closure showed the timetable. Hashrate Index figures cited in subsequent reporting put Binance Pool at about 9.2 exahashes per second, below 1% of Bitcoin’s network, compared with 26 EH/s and 2.3% in December. The distribution of that remaining 9.2 EH/s, not the headline size of the old pool, determines the immediate shift after November 10.
A deadline for shares, another for records
Binance says it will disable its Stratum URLs and mining endpoints at 07:00 UTC on November 10. Hash submissions after the cutoff will not be accepted, processed or credited. Its notice says eligible shares submitted before then enter the final reward calculation, while outstanding balances and refunds will be handled afterward under product terms, account status, checks and law. A customer must complete any required identity verification by 23:59 UTC that day to help processing.
Historical pool pages stay visible only until November 24 at 07:00 UTC. A miner should save the account’s hash history, payment statements and final share records before that point. A change of pool does not itself transfer an account balance or its tax and operating records. Binance’s notice explicitly asks users to download them. It does not publish a final aggregate payout number or a breakdown of outstanding balances.
Pool Savings users have a separate task: redeem or unsubscribe before the service ends. Cloud Mining and the accelerator end under the same notice. The economics of a physical mining operation differ from a cloud contract, so a pool’s hashrate cannot be treated as the number of people who need to migrate hardware. Some customers may be exposed through hosted machines or other arrangements that require their provider to make the change.
Binance said normal pool operation should continue up to the deadline. An operator may still choose to move earlier to test connectivity and payout settings while both endpoints work. Waiting for a disconnection increases the chance of a gap in credited shares if new settings, account approvals or backup pool addresses are wrong. Such a gap costs the miner revenue; it does not mean Bitcoin’s network has stopped producing blocks.
Nine exahashes cannot all be assigned to one buyer
A mining pool combines independent computing power and spreads block rewards according to a specified payout method. The 9.2 EH/s attributed to Binance is an estimate derived from observed or reported activity over a period, not a list of machines whose owners have signed for another pool. Hash power can already be switching between providers, and pool estimates vary with the measurement window and short term block luck.
A simple allocation example shows the scale. If all 9.2 EH/s moved to one large pool while network hash power and everyone else’s choices held steady, the recipient would gain a little under 1 percentage point of a network above 1,000 EH/s. Splitting that amount evenly among three providers would add roughly three tenths of a point to each. Neither is a forecast. The denominator can change with price, difficulty, seasonality and new machines, while pools’ published estimates may not agree on the same snapshot.
The October 15 Hashrate Index comparison put Foundry USA, AntPool and F2Pool together at 64.2%, versus 61.4% for the then leading three in December. The composition changed, so a three pool total does not show a single group gaining an identical amount. If every remaining Binance miner chose those leaders, their combined share might approach 65% on a fixed denominator. If miners chose smaller pools or mined alone, the concentration measure could move the other way.
A pool’s share of blocks is not the same as ownership of mining equipment. Operators can coordinate transaction selection and payout infrastructure, while customers can redirect machines. The ability to leave is meaningful, but switching has a cost if the pool supplies credit, custom firmware integration, a settlement currency or a payment arrangement that another provider cannot match. The real measure of choice is not the number of logos on a pool directory; it is the number of viable alternatives for a particular mine.
Payout policy can decide the destination
Binance used full pay per share, or FPPS, according to the reported pool terms. In broad terms, FPPS pays for submitted work according to an expected block and fee value while the operator absorbs some variation in the number of blocks actually found. The miner trades a degree of block luck risk for predictable settlement and a fee charged by the pool. The precise accounting and payout intervals depend on the provider’s terms.
A pay per last N shares system instead ties payments more closely to blocks found by the pool during the miner’s relevant work window. Its stated fee can be lower, but revenue is more variable over short periods. A small mine with regular power bills may value the stable cash flow from FPPS. A larger operator with reserves may tolerate a less predictable payout if the effective fee is attractive. Comparing advertised fees without adjusting for transaction fee treatment, stale shares, payment thresholds and settlement timing can select the wrong provider.
The miner must consider what receives the payout. A pool that sends BTC to a wallet under the miner’s control creates a different custody exposure from rewards left in an exchange account. Binance’s closure makes that distinction concrete: the machine may keep hashing until the cutoff, while the final account balance depends on the separate settlement process. A new pool’s minimum withdrawal threshold and terms for address changes can matter as much as a few basis points of stated fee.
There is a technical comparison, too. A distant endpoint, unreliable Stratum connection or poorly matched job assignments can increase rejected or stale work. The miner pays electricity for computations that may not earn full credit. Testing two backup endpoints and checking credited shares against a machine’s reported hash rate gives more information than a pool’s headline global hash rate. A pool can be large and still be a poor operational fit for a particular location.
Who picks the transactions in a block?
Under a conventional pool arrangement, the pool generally prepares the block template and miners work on it. A pool operator can choose fee paying transactions to include or exclude, subject to consensus rules and the miner’s option to move elsewhere. That gives a pool with a large share of hash power a form of transaction selection influence even though it does not own its customers’ hardware or change Bitcoin’s validity rules.
The Stratum V2 working group covered by crypto.news includes Foundry, AntPool, F2Pool and other major operators. Job negotiation is designed to give participating miners more control over the transaction set they mine, depending on the deployment. Support for a working group does not prove every customer’s equipment currently constructs its own template. The choice for an exiting Binance miner should include the actual Stratum version, job negotiation availability and whether the miner can use the function with its firmware and pool account.
Transaction selection matters when a payment is controversial, when a regulatory demand reaches an operator, or when fee revenue makes one set of transactions more profitable. A miner able to construct a valid template reduces reliance on a single operator’s preferences. The protection is not absolute: a provider still runs an endpoint, calculates payouts and can set participation conditions. Yet the migration is a moment when miners can compare what control each candidate offers in practice.
A block share chart has another limitation. In a short window, a pool may find more or fewer blocks than its true proportion of hash power predicts. An observer should use a sufficiently long period and compare more than one data source before calling a permanent concentration change. Public block attribution relies on identification in coinbase data or known payout patterns; unidentified blocks can complicate the picture.
Pool exits have happened before, for different reasons
SBI Crypto shut its mining pool in July, according to coverage of its roughly 2% network share. OKX had ended its pool services in 2024. These exits show that a branded pool can disappear without the underlying mining machines vanishing. They do not prove the same motive for each closure. Binance’s October 13 notice says it is reviewing products and services and does not disclose a pool operating loss.
Binance had previously treated mining as a larger business line. A 2022 miner lending announcement described a $500 million facility. The current closure notice does not say whether any loans from that initiative remain outstanding or whether loan customers must take a separate action. Pool service termination and a credit agreement are distinct legal relationships. Neither a remaining loan balance nor its disappearance can be inferred from the shutdown notice.
A provider may close a small service because the cost of payout guarantees, support and compliance outweighs revenue, or because it wants to concentrate on other products. Those are general business possibilities, not Binance’s disclosed reasons. The 65% drop in its estimated hash power gives the scale of lost activity, but without fees, staffing costs and financing exposure it cannot show profitability. A miner choosing a replacement should not assume the next provider is financially robust simply because its hash share is larger.
The smaller pool argument deserves a hearing
Directing work to a smaller operator could spread block template decisions across more parties. A miner who values that property might accept greater short term payout variation or a different settlement schedule. A smaller pool is not automatically safer or more independent, however. Its customers may use a shared custodian, its software may rely on a larger provider’s infrastructure, and its reserves for FPPS payments may be thinner. It has to be assessed as an actual operator.
Large pools have a case too. They can invest in reliability, geographically distributed endpoints, support and payment systems. A high block discovery rate reduces variance under methods that track actual pool wins. Mining firms with payroll and debt obligations may prioritize predictable daily proceeds over an abstract concentration measure. The question is whether those advantages require miners to give up control of templates and custody, and which provider offers a credible combination.
Earlier reporting on mining costs and Stratum V2 placed the protocol discussion alongside pressure on margins. A miner operating close to break even cannot make a symbolic pool choice without examining rejected work, fees and payment delay. Conversely, a small percentage point saving has limited value if a provider loses records or fails to pay. A rational comparison sets a period and calculates net BTC actually credited per unit of accepted work.
How to tell where the hash power landed
No public Binance list names the next pool for each miner. The first usable evidence will be changes in pool attributed blocks and estimated hash power after the announcement, followed by another reading after November 10. Announcements by individual mining companies can identify some moves, but they will not account for every customer. A period before the shutdown is important because miners can leave early.
The comparison needs a consistent denominator. A receiving pool’s EH/s can rise while its percentage falls if the total network grows faster. A pool’s percentage can rise without receiving Binance customers if competing miners switch off. The most convincing inference would combine named customer migrations with a sustained change in the recipient’s hash and block share and a corresponding decline at Binance, measured over the same interval.
An apparently clean transfer may be hidden by broader market conditions. Bitcoin’s price, mining difficulty, electricity contracts and equipment deployment all affect whether machines are online. Binance’s closure does not force all of its reported 9.2 EH/s to remain active on November 11. Some machines might pause for configuration, economics or a hosting decision. A lower Binance share and a smaller measured network are not proof that hash power was permanently destroyed.
The consumer facing impact should be described narrowly. Bitcoin’s difficulty adjustment and remaining hash power determine the network’s mining pace over time. Moving pooled equipment between endpoints changes who coordinates it, not the total amount of computing power if the equipment stays online. A temporary gap can change short term output, but a pool exit under 1% is not a forecast of a Bitcoin chain halt.
The fee quote is only one line in a miner’s ledger
Suppose two pools advertise fees of 2% and 2.5%. On one bitcoin of otherwise identical gross expected rewards, the half point difference is 0.005 BTC. The comparison becomes meaningless if one excludes transaction fees from the payout base or regularly credits less of a machine’s submitted work. A transparent review puts expected block subsidy, transaction fee sharing, pool charge, rejected shares and payout interval in the same accounting period. Those inputs are specific to the proposed providers; the example does not assert either fee applies to Binance or its rivals.
FPPS can involve the pool paying a miner even when the pool’s actual block wins temporarily fall short of expectation. That is a credit exposure to the operator. PPLNS or other block linked methods shift more short term luck onto participants. A provider’s size may support its ability to absorb variance, but the legal promise to pay and the custody of accrued balances remain important. A large brand cannot substitute for reading the payout contract.
A miner’s loan or equipment hosting agreement can further narrow its choice. A lender might require proceeds to enter a specified wallet, a hosting company might manage the machines’ configurations, and a curtailment program might switch power off during expensive hours. The pool closure notice does not say such arrangements exist for every Binance user. It means a customer should check who has authority to change the endpoint and whether reward flows are pledged before treating the migration as a personal dashboard setting.
The reward should be compared in BTC and in the currency used to pay costs. If a miner pays electricity in dollars and holds BTC, price moves change its realized margin independently of pool selection. A provider quoting a higher bitcoin payout but imposing a longer settlement delay can leave a thinly capitalized mine short of working cash. A scheduled payment and a withdrawal completed into the miner’s chosen wallet are separate events.
What the November 10 handover looks like on a machine
Mining equipment typically stores a primary pool endpoint, worker credentials and one or more fallback addresses. Moving to another provider requires an account or payout identity, a new endpoint and a valid destination for rewards. A miner can test accepted shares and reported hash rate before assigning the entire fleet. At scale, configuration can be rolled out in stages to avoid making the same mistake on thousands of machines at once.
Stratum connections relay work and share submissions; they do not transport the miner’s historical reward balance from one company to another. A miner who changes the endpoint today will start accumulating credit under the new provider’s accounting while Binance separately processes eligible old shares. Keeping the two statement sets is necessary to reconcile a period spanning the transition. The last payout might arrive after the last bit of hash power left Binance.
An unexpected interruption is easier to diagnose if operators capture three timestamps: the last accepted Binance share, the first accepted replacement share and the first new payout. The difference between the first two measures production lost to reconnection or misconfiguration. The interval to payment reflects the replacement pool’s threshold and schedule, not necessarily uncredited work. A backup endpoint can reduce downtime if the primary new endpoint fails, but only if it is configured and tested in advance.
The shutdown notice provides a precise cutoff, making this an observable operational story. Reporters can ask listed mining firms where they directed equipment and compare disclosed payouts or hashrate before and after. Anonymous statements from a pool that it attracted former Binance miners would need corroboration, since the pool cannot prove a sector wide allocation merely from its own signups.
Three measures of concentration tell different stories
Hash share approximates the computing power pointed at an operator. Block share counts blocks attributed to it over a period. Template control asks who chose transactions within those blocks. One measure can change without the others moving in lockstep. A pool might adopt job negotiation while retaining a high hash share, reducing centralized transaction choice without reducing the concentration in payout coordination. A miner might redirect work to a smaller pool that nonetheless uses another firm’s hosted software.
The simple sum of the top three shares is sensitive to who happens to occupy third place. The December comparison had ViaBTC in third; the later reading had F2Pool. A rise from 61.4% to 64.2% does not mean a single fixed coalition consolidated power. Another concentration statistic, such as the combined share of the top five measured over several weeks, could distinguish a broad drift toward large operators from a one month reshuffle. Pool data should specify whether it uses estimated hash or identified blocks.
There is a governance dimension beyond market share. If a pool announces it will exclude a valid category of transactions, can customers select their own templates or readily leave? If an endpoint fails, how quickly can a fleet reconnect elsewhere? If a provider withholds rewards, does the miner have independently saved proof of accepted shares? Binance’s exit offers an unusually clear, dated example of why those capabilities matter even when nobody has alleged misconduct.
A pool’s software is not the same as Bitcoin consensus
Users sometimes interpret mining pool concentration as if three operators can rewrite Bitcoin’s rules. A valid block must still satisfy the consensus rules enforced by nodes. A pool coordinating a large fraction of hash power can influence the transactions its participants attempt to include and the timing or selection of candidate blocks. It cannot cause fully validating nodes to accept an invalid coin issuance merely by winning a majority of ordinary block races.
Crypto.news’s discussion of Bitcoin decentralization made the distinction between pool coordination and machine ownership. It is relevant to the Binance migration because the miners leaving can choose a new template provider while their equipment and economic interests remain distributed. Concentration is still a concern if many independently owned machines depend on a small number of coordinators for jobs and payouts, but its mechanism should be named precisely.
The mempool explanation describes the pending transactions from which a block producer normally selects. A pool can prioritize higher fee transactions or apply its own policy to valid candidates. A miner using its own job template may choose differently while respecting consensus. If Binance’s former customers flow to large pools that offer functional job negotiation, their collective payout coordination might become more concentrated even as transaction selection becomes less so.
A genuine test would survey receiving pools on whether job negotiation is live for ordinary customers, report how many use it and identify whether a miner can choose its own transaction set without losing the payout model it needs. A declaration of protocol support is an engineering milestone. Measured customer use of the feature is the market structure result.
What the pool can tell its customers before the last block
Binance can publish the final accepted share cutoff and explain the calculation for late work and pending rewards. Its notice already gives the timestamp, 07:00 UTC on November 10, but not the eventual amount payable across accounts. A miner reconciling its own earnings can compare local share logs with the pool’s records, check any stale share adjustment and save the resulting statement before the November 24 archive cutoff.
A replacement provider’s terms should state whether a miner’s pending rewards are held in custody, when a payout becomes irrevocable and what happens if the pool stops operating. The distinction matters because a pool may pay miners before its own expected blocks materialize under FPPS. A miner taking the lowest quoted fee from a provider that cannot make those payments may have traded a known charge for a hard to quantify claim on the operator.
The closure can end without a visible disruption to Bitcoin while still leaving a costly cleanup for individual customers. Final balances, tax histories and cloud product redemptions are account level matters. A report after November 10 should check both the network’s hash distribution and whether the people who supplied that hash received what the old pool owed them. The two outcomes are related by the exit, but neither showes the other.
What to watch
- November 10 at 07:00 UTC: Whether Binance disables its endpoints and how it reports eligible pre-cutoff shares.
- November 10 at 23:59 UTC: The deadline Binance gives customers to finish any required identity checks for final settlement.
- November 24 at 07:00 UTC: The end of access to Binance Pool’s historical account pages.
- Pool attribution: A sustained, same-window change in Binance and receiving pools’ hash and block shares after migrations.
- Miner disclosures: Named changes of provider, payout method or transaction template control by operators previously using Binance.
FAQ
When will Binance Pool close?
Binance says its mining endpoints and share acceptance will stop at 07:00 UTC on November 10, 2026. Historical account pages remain available until 07:00 UTC on November 24.
What should a Binance Pool miner change?
The miner must point its machines to a replacement pool before the cutoff to continue submitting credited work. It should verify the new account, payout address and accepted share count, and save Binance’s historical statements.
Will miners lose rewards earned before November 10?
Binance says eligible shares submitted before 07:00 UTC on November 10 will enter its final reward calculation. Final balances remain subject to its product terms and account checks.
How much Bitcoin hash power was on Binance Pool?
The October estimate was about 9.2 EH/s, less than 1% of the network, compared with roughly 26 EH/s and 2.3% in December. Estimates depend on the period and data source.
Will all Binance miners go to Foundry or AntPool?
No destination has been disclosed for the entire group. Miners can split among large and small pools, mine independently, or temporarily stop, so any allocation today is hypothetical.
Does a pool own its miners’ machines?
Generally no. A mining pool coordinates submitted work and rewards from independent equipment. Customer contracts and hosting arrangements can still affect how quickly an operator changes providers.
What is FPPS?
Full pay per share pays submitted work according to an expected block reward and fee calculation while the pool takes on some short term block luck risk. Fees and exact terms vary by provider.
Does the closure endanger Bitcoin’s operation?
A pool exit under 1% of reported hash power does not imply a network halt. Miners can redirect work, and the longer term effect on pool concentration remains to be measured. This is educational analysis, not investment advice.
Disclaimer: This article is for information and educational purposes only and does not constitute financial or investment advice. Figures reflect regulatory filings and reporting available at the time of writing and change with each disclosure. Nothing here is a recommendation to buy, sell, or hold any security or asset. Always do your own research. Information is accurate as of October 15, 2026.
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