Russia Is Shifting From Artillery And Tanks To FPV Drones

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The Russian military has historically followed a Soviet-era doctrine that emphasizes the use of massed fires to destroy enemy defenses before maneuver forces advance. These fires have traditionally been delivered by a combination of tanks and artillery. While this approach provided Russia with some gains early in its ongoing war with Ukraine, it is currently facing a major challenge from Ukrainian “kill zones.” These zones extend outward from Ukrainian lines and are patrolled by drones specifically searching for Russian vehicles and personnel. Over the past year, these zones have expanded in many regions beyond the effective range of Russian artillery and armor, limiting their relevance to the fight.

At the tactical level, Russia appears to have found a solution to this issue through the use of FPV drones. Recent Ukrainian reports indicate that Russia has been launching thousands of radio-controlled FPV drones per day in the area around Druzhkivka and Dobropillia as part of its effort to capture these cities. This increased usage coincides with Russia realigning some of its armored units into drone-assault formations. By using drones to deliver fires, Russia can adhere to its traditional doctrine while replacing many of the roles previously performed by artillery and tanks.

Ukrainian Drones Are Pushing Back Russian Artillery

Russian force structure has historically reflected this emphasis on firepower. During the initial invasion of Ukraine, Russian forces were organized into Battalion Tactical Groups, which concentrated substantial artillery capability at the tactical level, allowing Russian commanders to employ fires in support of relatively small maneuver formations. Although Russia has since moved away from the construct, artillery remains central to its approach to ground combat. The scale of this reliance was particularly evident during the 2022 fighting in the Donbas region, when Russian forces were firing approximately 20,000 artillery rounds per day, with peak rates exceeding 32,000 rounds on some days.

This reliance on firepower reflects a relatively risk-averse approach to ground combat. Rather than immediately exposing maneuver forces to direct contact, Russian commanders typically first attempt to inflict sufficient losses on Ukrainian defenders to make the subsequent assault more manageable. However, fires alone cannot seize terrain. Infantry and armored forces must eventually move forward to exploit the effects of the bombardment. If they cannot move quickly enough, Ukrainian forces can reinforce threatened sectors, establish new defensive positions, or reoccupy terrain once the fires shift elsewhere. This inability to rapidly convert firepower into maneuver has contributed to the slow, incremental character of many Russian advances despite Russia’s substantial advantage in available fires.

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Ukrainian drones have steadily undermined this approach by expanding the depth at which Russian forces are vulnerable. Tanks and armored vehicles were affected first, as persistent surveillance and FPV strikes made operating near the front more dangerous. Ukraine’s kill zones currently extend 10 to 15 kilometers forward of their lines, with some units striking targets out to 30 kilometers. The expanding kill zones now place artillery within range, particularly systems such as the D-30 and 2S1, which have effective ranges of roughly 15 to 22 kilometers. Ukraine’s intermediate-range strike campaign has extended this threat even farther by targeting longer-range artillery systems and their supporting infrastructure. As a result, Ukrainian drones are making it increasingly difficult for Russia to employ its traditional combination of armor and artillery near the front. This shift is also reflected in Russian Ministry of Defense messaging. Throughout much of the war, the ministry frequently posted videos of artillery systems conducting fire missions. These posts have diminished in recent months, as artillery has become less relevant to frontline operations.

Russia Is Replacing Artillery With FPV Drones

As part of its reduced reliance on traditional systems for delivering fires, the Russian military appears to be shifting parts of its force structure away from armored formations and toward drone and dismounted assault operations. In northern Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts, Russian forces are reportedly disbanding some tank battalions and reallocating younger servicemembers to drone units, while assigning other personnel to assault units. This reorganization indicates an increased focus on drone teams and smaller assault elements, which are better suited to the current battlefield.

This shift in focus is particularly evident around Druzhkivka, which has emerged as an important target of Russia’s offensive in the Donetsk region. The city is part of Ukraine’s Fortress Belt, a series of heavily defended cities that Russia must overcome to advance farther into the region. Given the importance of capturing Druzhkivka, Russian forces have allocated significant drone resources to support operations in the area. Russian drone operators are reportedly launching over 1,500 radio-controlled FPV drones per day against Ukrainian positions and logistics routes. They are also launching approximately 1,200 radio-controlled FPV drones per day toward Dobropillia, southwest of Druzhkivka. These numbers do not include the large number of fiber-optic-controlled FPV drones that are also being launched, which Ukrainian forces have difficulty detecting and counting.

This growing reliance on FPV drones allows Russia to preserve its fires-heavy approach despite the vulnerability of artillery and armored vehicles. Rather than relying on artillery to suppress Ukrainian positions before an assault, Russian drone teams can search for and strike individual positions, vehicles, and personnel in the region. Large numbers of FPV drones are able to suppress Ukrainian troops by forcing them to remain under cover, giving Russian assault groups greater freedom to advance. In this way, massed FPV drones can produce the same tactical and psychological effects traditionally generated by sustained artillery bombardment.

Drone teams have several advantages over the artillery systems and armored vehicles traditionally used to deliver fires. They have a much smaller physical footprint and can disperse or conceal themselves several kilometers behind the front. Additionally, drone operators require less training than artillery crews, allowing Russia to generate and replace these teams more quickly. They can also launch large numbers of relatively inexpensive drones without exposing a major weapons system each time they conduct a strike. Losing individual drones is far less consequential than losing an artillery piece or armored vehicle.

FPV drones are only one layer of this emerging fires architecture. Larger drones operating farther behind Russian lines can strike targets at greater distances, while aircraft deliver glide bombs against fortified positions and other high-value targets. Together, these systems allow Russia to deliver fires across multiple depths while reducing its dependence on artillery operating within Ukraine’s expanding drone kill zones.

Drones Will Increasingly Shape Russian Tactical Fires

As drone technology advances, Ukrainian FPV drones will operate at longer ranges, further pushing Russian artillery systems back and eventually beyond their effective ranges. Meanwhile, Russia will capitalize on these advances as well, with its longer-range drones becoming increasingly capable of performing many of the fire missions traditionally assigned to artillery. As a result, Russia will likely convert more traditional armor and artillery formations into drone-supported assault units as this approach spreads across the front. More broadly, drones could soon become Russia’s primary method for delivering tactical fires.

Meanwhile, Ukraine will have to adapt its defenses to the increased use of Russian FPV drones. Given the rapid pace of drone development, these systems are difficult to consistently counter through conventional means. Ukraine possesses substantial counter-drone equipment, but the sheer volume of FPVs has the potential to overwhelm kinetic defenses. Electronic warfare provides another layer of protection, but its effectiveness can diminish as drone technology and operating methods evolve. As such, Ukraine will need to adjust its defenses to counter large numbers of FPV drones through a layered approach that combines physical barriers, kinetic and non-kinetic defenses, and glide bombs to destroy Russian drone operator positions.

Despite Russia’s growing use of FPV drones to bring fires back into the fight, its territorial gains will likely remain limited. The Institute for the Study of War reported that despite Russia launching thousands of FPV drones around Druzhkivka and Dobropillya directions each day, they have made no confirmed advances in the area. This adaptation does not solve Russia’s fundamental maneuver challenge. Instead, it allows Russia to maintain its reliance on fires while avoiding the risks associated with larger ground assaults. This approach may make it increasingly difficult for Ukraine to counterattack, but it also limits Russia’s ability to exploit breakthroughs and make significant advances. The result will be a continuation of the slow, attritional fighting that has characterized much of the war.



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