The U.S. Department of Justice has filed five civil forfeiture complaints seeking more than $25 million in cryptocurrency it alleges is linked to international romance and investment frauds that targeted victims in both Canada and the United States. According to the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia and the U.S. Secret Service, the case stems from separate investigations conducted by the Cyber Fraud Task Force.
Prosecutors say victims were persuaded into believing they were making legitimate digital asset investments, only for their funds to be routed through laundering networks designed to obscure the origin and movement of stolen crypto. The DOJ describes tactics that frequently blend social engineering, fraudulent trading platforms, and layered wallet transfers to make recovery difficult.
Key takeaways
- The DOJ is pursuing five civil forfeiture actions targeting more than $25 million in crypto tied to romance and investment scams.
- One complaint seeks about $12.1 million connected to romance schemes affecting more than 200 victims.
- Another action seeks $10.4 million tied to suspected victim transactions involving more than 270 people.
- Authorities allege the launderers were largely based in Southeast Asia, with related IP activity associated with China, Malaysia, and Cambodia.
- International enforcement has recently intensified against similar social engineering–to-crypto laundering pipelines, including Interpol’s Operation First Light 2026.
DOJ targets crypto tied to romance and fake investment platforms
In a statement, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia and the U.S. Secret Service said the assets were recovered as part of investigations associated with the Cyber Fraud Task Force. DOJ officials allege that scammers identified thousands of victims worldwide and misled them into believing they were investing in digital assets.
The largest complaint seeks approximately $12.1 million and is tied to romance-based frauds that reportedly defrauded more than 200 victims. Prosecutors say proceeds were routed through intermediary addresses and commingled with funds from other victims—an approach that can complicate attribution and recovery efforts.
A second complaint seeks $10.4 million and involves more than 270 suspected victim transactions. DOJ also filed three smaller complaints, which prosecutors describe as involving fake investment accounts and an additional “recovery” scheme—an escalation pattern seen in many fraud ecosystems, where initial victims are later targeted again with offers to help them get their money back for a new fee or deposit.
Where laundering allegedly operated—and how identities were masked
The DOJ said the alleged laundering infrastructure was predominantly located in Southeast Asia, while related IP addresses were associated with China, Malaysia, and Cambodia. While the filing describes these characteristics at a high level, the enforcement theory is consistent: criminals sought to break the on-chain connection between victim payments and the addresses that ultimately benefited.
Prosecutors frame the problem as more than a direct “investment” fraud. They argue that crypto-enabled romance scams typically rely on social engineering to build trust, then steer victims toward fraudulent trading or investment platforms. After funds are placed, investigators say the money is moved through multiple wallet layers and networks that help conceal the stolen funds’ trail.
Interpol operation highlights the scale of social engineering to crypto laundering
This DOJ filing follows broader international enforcement activity focused on social engineering scams and the financial networks used to launder their proceeds. According to earlier reporting from Cointelegraph, Interpol-coordinated Operation First Light 2026 involved 97 countries and territories. Interpol said the operation led to 5,811 arrests and the interception of $283 million in illicit assets.
Interpol also reported that the operation identified more than 142,000 victims and blocked more than 31,000 bank accounts. Within the operation, Thai authorities reportedly uncovered a network that allegedly converted romance-scam proceeds into crypto. Investigators also described the use of cross-chain token swaps to further obscure the movement of funds.
Cointelegraph reported that a wallet associated with a suspected money launderer processed more than $122.5 million in crypto over a period of 10 months. While that figure comes from Interpol-linked reporting rather than the DOJ civil forfeiture filings themselves, the overlap underscores the same operational playbook: trust-building scams, movement of funds into crypto, then multi-step transfers and trading-like activity to frustrate tracing.
Earlier U.S. actions show stablecoin laundering patterns
The DOJ’s move also fits into a wider pattern of U.S. enforcement against crypto used in romance and investment frauds. Cointelegraph previously noted that, in February, federal agents seized over $61 million in USDT stablecoin from addresses allegedly associated with laundering proceeds tied to fraudulent investment platforms.
In that earlier account, investigators described a workflow similar to the one now reflected in the forfeiture complaints: scammers build trust through romantic relationships, steer victims to fake trading platforms, and then move funds across multiple wallets. The DOJ complaint language adds further detail about how schemes can evolve into “recovery” scams and about how funds can be commingled among victims—both of which affect how law enforcement attempts to dismantle networks and how victims may later attempt to locate assets.
For readers, the key point is practical: these cases show that the fraud often shifts from social manipulation to financial plumbing. Even when victims send funds into what appears to be a legitimate digital asset transaction, the traceable parts can be deliberately fragmented through intermediaries, layered transfers, and cross-network activity.
As the forfeiture cases proceed, the next watchpoints are straightforward: whether courts allow the government to establish ownership and tracing theories at the complaint stage, and whether additional actions follow targeting other wallets or infrastructure tied to the same alleged laundering clusters.
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