Where Can Europe Look For Energy Diversity?

Russia Is Not An Option

The transformation of European gas supply since 2022 is dramatic. Before Russia’s invasion, Russian gas supplied roughly 45 percent of EU imports. That share has fallen to approximately 12 percent, as the bloc has enacted a legally binding phase-out of remaining Russian pipeline gas and LNG contracts, with the last long-term agreements due to expire by autumn 2027. Hungary and Slovakia have continued receiving Russian gas through TurkStream under pre-war contracts, illustrating the gap between Brussels’ strategic position and the behavior of individual member states.

Several European energy companies with long-term ties to the Kremlin remain highly proactive: they have nevertheless discussed the possibility of resumed Russian supply if relations were eventually normalized. Didier Holleaux of Engie and Patrick Pouyanné of TotalEnergies have each cited potential Russian exports of 60 to 70 billion cubic meters annually under such circumstances.

However, even if the political situation surrounding Ukraine changes, Europe is unlikely to reconstruct its previous dependence on Russia. Ursula von der Leyen affirmed that wasn’t an option even if Moscow totally acquiesces to European demands regarding Ukraine. The experience of 2022 demonstrated the danger of allowing a single supplier to acquire structural leverage over the continent’s energy system. Europe therefore needs to concentrate on what replaces Russian gas rather than debating whether the old relationship can be restored.

Choice One: The Middle East

The most obvious replacement has been LNG from the Middle East. Qatar possesses enormous gas reserves and is one of the world’s most important LNG suppliers. For Europe, however, the region presents precisely the kind of concentration risk that diversification is supposed to reduce.

The problem is geography. Much of the region’s energy infrastructure sits within reach of conflicts involving Iran, Israel, Turkey, the Gulf states, and the United States. Iranian missile strikes on Qatar’s Ras Laffan industrial complex in March 2026 damaged facilities responsible for a significant portion of Qatar’s LNG exports. QatarEnergy estimated that repairs could take three to five years and declared force majeure on affected contracts.

A diversified list of suppliers alone is not necessarily a diversified energy system. If large portions of supply depend upon the same maritime routes, a missile strike, naval confrontation, or regional war can disrupt them simultaneously. China’s growing influence adds another layer of political risk. Beijing is deeply embedded in the region’s energy economy and maintains relationships with both Iran and the Gulf monarchies. Europe should continue purchasing Middle Eastern energy, but it should not treat the region as the foundation of its diversification strategy. America, Europe, and China have learned the perils of relying on Middle Eastern energy too much.

Choice Two: The Trans-Saharan Pipeline

The proposed Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline would connect Nigeria’s enormous gas resources to Algeria via Niger and then to Europe’s existing North African pipeline network. The 4,128-kilometer system is designed to carry as much as 30 billion cubic meters annually but would take years to complete and require sustained political commitment from Nigeria, Niger, Algeria, and European buyers. The funding will be massive, between $10-13 billion. Construction restarted in June 2026 after intermittent delays.

This is precisely the kind of infrastructure Europe would pursue. If completed, it would provide access to a major additional source of gas without requiring European consumers to depend upon a distant maritime LNG supply chain, while deepening economic ties between Europe and Africa. Unfortunately, past delays make it a showcase of European missteps in energy and investment policy.

There are also serious political risks. Niger remains unstable, and the pipeline would cross territory where governments have struggled to maintain control. The attempted coup in Niger in August 2026, which Russia is claiming it thwarted, is a reminder that political risk in the Sahel is not an abstract concern for investors.

The project is also exposed to North Africa’s complicated politics. Algeria and Morocco remain divided over Western Sahara, while their diplomatic disputes have repeatedly affected regional energy relationships. Spain’s changing relationship with Algeria, warming in pursuit of gas, has demonstrated how quickly energy can become entangled with broader political disputes. Morocco likely retaliated for this visit, although Morocco and Spain deny it, by enabling the recent refugee crisis in Spain’s North African enclaves.

Choice Three: The Caspian Logic

The most immediately accessible option for Europe is the Caspian region. The Southern Gas Corridor already connects Azerbaijani hydrocarbons to European markets through Georgia and Turkey. The system runs through the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) connecting South Caucasus and Turkey, and Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) which reaches Greece, Albania, and Italy, with a spur to Bulgaria and eventually, Montenegro, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Unlike the Trans-Saharan pipeline, it does not need to be built from scratch. Unlike LNG from Qatar, its supply does not depend upon a Middle Eastern maritime chokepoint.

In 2022, the European Commission signed a memorandum of understanding with Azerbaijan to increase gas flows through the corridor from approximately 10 billion cubic meters to 20 billion cubic meters annually by 2027. As of early 2026, approximately 11.5 billion cubic meters was flowing, far from the target. The constraint is upstream, where the South Caucasus Pipeline and TANAP are operating at their existing technological limits because Brussels didn’t follow through on necessary investments.

Energy analysts have identified a relatively straightforward solution: eight additional compression stations capable of raising throughput at an estimated cost of approximately $400 million. As far as gas pipeline projects are concerned, this is peanuts. Construction could potentially take twelve to eighteen months if financing is available.

This is where European energy policy begins to look less like a strategic plan and more like a byzantine parody. Europe has spent substantially more than $400 million on LNG infrastructure since Russia’s invasion, while an existing pipeline corridor that Europe itself agreed should double its supply remains constrained by a comparatively modest investment.

Ephemeral disputes between Brussels and Baku are derailing what should be a strategic pillar of Europe’s energy and strategic relations. Azerbaijan’s President Aliyev and Armenia’s Prime Minister Pashinyan managed to overcome far greater obstacles to cooperation and signed a peace pledge at the White House that has not only held but boosted American investment in the region. Conversely, the undiplomatic response of the chair of the European parliament Roberta Metsola to President Aliyev’s consternation over European inaction during a summit in Yerevan, doesn’t inspire confidence in European foreign or energy policy, while the U.S. and Armenia act constructively towards regional peace and energy cooperation.

Azerbaijan as a hydrocarbon supplier perfectly complements European energy needs. Azerbaijan is an emerging middle power, secular, energy-rich, geographically positioned between Europe and Central Asia, willing to sell Europe gas, and skeptical of Iran, Russia, and China. It also has an interest in preventing its energy infrastructure from becoming subordinate to Russia or China. Whatever differences there are, Brussels shouldn’t let perfection be the enemy of the good.

Defeat From the Jaws of Victory

Europe’s energy problems are increasingly a failure of financing, execution and follow-through. It has reduced dependence on Russia and secured large volumes of American LNG, yet it has struggled to turn other diversification agreements into physical capacity. The three alternatives illustrate that Europe is not without options. Nor is it some prisoner of circumstance. Rather, Europe has once again failed to make necessary investments in its own energy security.

Brussels needs an energy policy attuned to the conditions Europe faces rather than what it wants to be true. The green energy transition will take years. During that period, Europeans will still need electricity, especially as the AI sector proliferates. Restricting advanced energy technologies, eliminating Russian energy, and relying increasingly on American LNG leaves little margin for error if geopolitics again shift or renewable deployments fall short.

Brussels’ energy policy shortcomings won’t be solved overnight, but it can quickly follow through on the agreements it has already signed and finance infrastructure it has already identified as important. Europe has spent years closing its eyes and ears to the dangers of excessive dependence on Russian gas. Its next energy strategy should ensure that no single supplier acquires comparable leverage again. That requires building redundancy before the next crisis rather than discovering the gaping energy shortages as it repeatedly did in the past.